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ABSTRACT
In the past years the scientific community is investigat-
ing with increasing interest innovative techniques to provide
vertical guidance to aviation users up to precision approach
and even autonomous guidance on ground. Next to SBAS
and GBAS systems other novel architectures have been under
investigated. In particular the ARAIM concept is based on the
fact that the future of multiconstellation and multifrequency
signals will offer the possibility to reduce the dependency from
the ground infrastructure and consequently reduce further the
deployment and operation costs. The user will be provided
with an augmentation signal (Integrity Support Message) up-
dated and transmitted with a long latency. This is the idea of
the Advanced Receiver Autonomous Monitoring.
This paper proposes an architecture which aims on one
hand to maximize the reuse of existing infrastructure and on
the other to provide the user with the necessary robustness
required mostly in the early next years by new constellations.
The differentiating factor among the different alternatives is
the so called Time to ISM Alarm, the update frequency
and dissemination of the ISM information. The proposed
architecture foresees the provision of two different type of
messages: a long term one addressing nominal conditions and
a short term one to detect anomaly conditions.
The paper presents also the user algorithms suitable for this
architecture which optimizes the user availability by reducing
the protection level with respect to existing solutions. The
performance of the user algorithm has been analysed in a real
scenario: a receiver in front of an airport hangar disturbed by
a GNSS repeater. The paper shows how the user algorithm
can detect the disturbance and reject it. Furthermore the
protection level performances is also shown, and in particular
its improvement with respect to existing ARAIM algorithm
[1].
I. INTRODUCTION
The design of the Integrity Support Message (ISM) Ar-
chitecture enabling the fulfilment of the aviation precision
approach requirements for a standalone GNSS receiver with
Advanced Receiver Autonomous Integrity Monitoring tech-
niques is an interesting and challenging topic. This paper
aims to contribute to the discussion proposing an ARAIM
architecture design and an user algorithm suitable for the
proposed architecture.
This introduction describes the context and the ARAIM
design factors addressed by the approach proposed in the
second section. Secondly the architecture and the user algo-
rithm are detailed in the second section. Finally a measurement
campaign where the proposed algorithms were validated with
real GPS, GLONASS and Galileo constellation is described in
the third section.
1) Integrity Requirements for aviation users: The objective
of the ARAIM concept is to provide the aviation users with
vertical guidance up to precision approach based on multi-
constellation GNSS signals. Navigation systems supporting
vertical guidance of aircraft are subject to several requirements
governing their performance. The requirements are standard-
ized through the International Civil Aviation Organization
(ICAO). The target operation levels are LPV, LPV-200 and
beyond, which are specified in the ICAO Standards And
Recommended Practices SARPs [2], as follows (Selection of
the criteria):
• Fault-free vertical accuracy 4m at 95% and 10m at 10−7,
• Faulty-case vertical accuracy 15m at 10−5,
• Vertical error bound 15m at the 0.5· integrity risk1
(Vertical Alert Limit VAL),
• Integrity risk 2 · 10−7 per approach (150s),
• Time-to-Alert (TTA) 6 seconds.
These represent some of the most strict requirements for
GNSS applications at the present. They refer to small per-
centiles (10−7) and to short operation intervals (approach
duration of 150s), on which the user must be alerted within
6s when a failure condition occurs.
2) Advanced RAIM Architecture and Design Drivers:
The ARAIM concept was proposed within the U.S. GPS
Evolutionary Architecture Study report [3]. Further evolution
has been provided by the Working Group C ARAIM Technical
Subgroup Interim Report [4]. The proposed receiver algorithm
is based on the Multiple Hypothesis Solution Separation
method described by [1].
The new concept of ISM/ARAIM represents an interesting
possibility to meet the strict LPV integrity requirements. At
present the architecture design is an open topic, containing
several alternatives still to be screened.
Many aspects influence and determine the optimum de-
sign: liability constrains of the Aviation Navigation Service
Providers (ANSP) and GNSS Providers, politic agreement
among states and certification-standardization authorities, eco-
nomic aspects related to the need to reuse as much as possible
existing infrastructure, etc. This paper will focus only on the
technical aspects.
The main ISM Architecture design drivers are the follow-
ings:
• the monitoring network in charge of collecting the ob-
servables used to compute the ISM content. Its coverage
might be global (e.g. GNSS sensor stations network
or IGS network with suitable service and commitment
1Precisely the integrity risk defines the probability that either the vertical
error or the horizontal error is above the limit without notification. A possible
partition of the risk is the allocation of 0.5PHMI to vertical, other partitions
use more risk for vertical and less for horizontal. The proposed algorithm in
fact does not perform such a partition at all.
level), regional (e.g. SBAS like network) or local (e.g.
GBAS like monitoring stations),
• the dissemination network in charge of sending the ISM
to the final user. Its coverage might also be global
(e.g. GNSS constellation), regional (GNSS constellation
transmitting regional information, or subset of a GNSS
constellation, e.g. orbiting only on a specific region, or
GEO satellites) or local (VHF data link like VHF Data
Broadcasting link of GBAS),
• the ISM latency, i.e. ”the time it takes for the ground
network to identify an issue in the space segment and
alert the aircraft to that issue” [1],
• the Constellation Service Provider commitment, that is
the responsibility taken by the GNSS service provider in
guaranteing a certain level of required performance,
• the ASNP regulatory requirements, that ability from each
country and region to delegate risk of operations.
Not all the combinations of the previous alternatives are
feasible. Most of them do not provide the desired perfor-
mance. The following sections analyze and identify technical
constrains and proposes a design optimization.
II. ADVANCED RAIM ARCHITECTURE
This section provides a description of the ARAIM architec-
ture with a focus on the ground subsystem. The purpose of the
ground system in ARAIM is to provide integrity parameters
to the users, known as the Integrity Support Message (ISM).
As opposed to classical RAIM [5] where these parameters are
fixed assumptions on the signal-in-space (SIS) performance,
the ARAIM architecture is more flexible: A dedicated ground
system monitors GNSS performance and adapts the integrity
parameters. Depending on the particular architecture, these
updates can either be executed at a higher rate in the range
of hour or minutes, at longer intervals, or only when needed
(conserving the long latency nature). Generally, the update
intervals will always be longer than the TTA requirement
of 6 seconds. The rate of updates determines the level of
performance that can be obtained (more frequent updates allow
for less overestimation of the errors and thus less conservatism
in the integrity threat models), but small latency of these
updates also increases the operational cost of the infrastructure
(Required data links during flight of aircraft).
In contrast to the majority of other proposals (e.g. [1]),
this paper uses a combination of long-term and short-term
monitoring to maximize the obtainable system performance.
The two kinds of Integrity Support Messages (ISM) that are
sent to the user are:
• An ISM with a long latency in the order of months,
or only updated when needed. This message could be
disseminated using terrestrial (VDB) or satellite based
(GEOs, or GNSS) means,
• A second ISM with a shorter latency in the order of
minutes to hours. Depending on the interval, different
dissemination strategies become available: Delivery of
the ISM at dispatch for intervals longer than the flight
duration, or data link based updates either from terrestrial
(VDB) or satellite based (GEOs, or GNSS) data transmit-
ters when the aircraft is in the arrival/approach phase at
the destination airport.
The low-latency ISM is used to monitor baseline assump-
tions on the Signal-In-Space Error (SISE) such as the distri-
bution of its nominal magnitude and the likelihood that a fault
occurs, invalidating the nominal error model. The short-latency
ISM adds a short-term upper bound on the actual SISE.
The user algorithm can either apply only the information
provided by the long-term monitoring part of the architecture,
or both the long-term and the short-term messages. This
flexibility is obtained by allocating a partition of the threats
either to the short-term monitoring or to the user algorithm,
depending on ISM availability. This allocation is reflected in
a different test threshold of the FDE algorithm. This threshold
depends on the update rate of the short term ISM. Once a
possible range of values for the update rate has been defined,
the corresponding FDE threshold can be described as a lookup
table and hardcoded in the receiver. The ARAIM performance
is better when current ISM short-term data is available, in fact
the user detection requirements are relaxed and the availability
improves. And the increased level of complexity at receiver
level is acceptable.
Fig. 1. ARAIM Architecture design
A. Long latency ISM
The long latency ISM aims to provide the user with infor-
mation on the system behaviour in nominal conditions. Using
this information the user can estimate the risk due to nominal
errors. The monitoring network providing the long term ISM
is a global sparse network able to process multiconstellation
multifrequency signals. Suitable ground networks would be
the ground segments of the GNSS, or SBAS or networks like
IGS if the data is available at an adequate service level and
with the required committment. The distribution of the ground
network receivers must be sufficient to observe all satellites at
all times at a geometric diversity that allows for separation of
3-D ephemeris biases and clock biases.
The update rate for the long-term ISM data is in the order
of one month or can be updated only when necessary. In
particular the information provided to the user are2:
• Bnom: bias of the distribution bounding the nominal SISE
• σURA: standard deviation of the distribution bounding the
SISE
• Psat: satellite failure probability, i.e. probability that the
nominal error model is invalid
• Pconst: constellation failure probability
The information on the SISE distribution, that is Bnom and
σURA are provided in the satellite domain, specifying the long-
track, cross-track, radial and clock components. If the link
bandwidth does allow it, the covariance matrix for these values
should be provided, that means including the extradiagonal
cross-correlation components. In case of bandwidth constrains
then the scalar values should be foreseen. As the dissemination
may be sporadic, no continuous link is necessary. Possible
candidates for transmission of the long-term ISM are:
• GNSS in-band dissemination
• GEOs, in particular including the data into SBAS mes-
sages
• Local area data links at dispatch of the aircraft and/or at
gate of originating airport
• The NAV database found within aircraft Flight Manage-
ment Systems (FMS), which is today updated at a 28
days interval.
It is highlighted that the long term monitoring does not pro-
vide the error bounding through re-estimation of the satellite
orbit and clock but by monitoring the validity of the URA and
SISA navigation message values and inflate them if they do
not perform a proper error bounding.
The probability of SISE exceeding the threshold T can be
denoted as
P (|SISE| > T ) =
P (|SISE| > T |σT ≤ σURA)P (σT ≤ URA)+
P (|SISE| > T |σT ≤ σURA)
P (σT ≤ σURA)P (σT > URA)+
P (|SISE| > T |σT > σURA)
P (σT > σURA)P (σT > URA). (1)
where σT indicates the true standard deviation of the SISE,
σURA the long latency ISM information and the URA the
bounding value of the navigation message.
The first term
P (|SISE| > T |σT ≤ σURA)P (σT ≤ URA) (2)
represents the case in which the navigation message informa-
tion URA performs a correct bounding. This case is covered
by the user algorithm in the protection level estimation.
The second one
P (|SISE| > T |σT ≤ σURA)P (σT ≤ σURA)P (σT > URA)
(3)
2Note that all the estimates obtained from ground monitoring are established
per satellite. The index i referring to a particular satellite is omitted here and
in the subsequent sections for simplicity.
represents the case in which URA is not properly bounding but
the ISM information σURA does allowing a correct protection
level estimation by the user.
Finally the third one
P (|SISE| > T |σT > σURA)P (σT > σURA)P (σT > URA)
(4)
is the remaining risk, when both the GNSS and ARAIM
ground monitoring fail in providing a correct bounding of
the satellite orbit and clock errors. There is no possibility
to control this term with additional monitoring. So the only
possibility is to keep this term small with respect to the 10−7
integrity requirement. As it can be noted, the product of the
two must be < 10−7 and not each of them. But this significant
advantage is only ensured if the ARAIM ground monitoring
performs a bounding monitoring. Instead if it performs a
navigation message re-estimation then the σURA must satisfy
alone the integrity requirements. This might be a critical aspect
for a new deployed architecture, in particular dealing with new
constellations, because a long data history is needed to reach
the required confidence level.
The objective of the long-term ground monitoring can thus
be split into two parts, which are subsequently detailed: The
estimation of the nominal error model and the verification of
satellite fault rates and constellation fault rates.
1) Estimation of nominal Signal-in-Space Error (SISE)
parameters: The MHSS ARAIM user algorithm provides
integrity by estimation of an upper bound for the position error.
The fundamental assumption for a robust bound is a conser-
vative model of the range error distribution, i.e. the likelihood
that the error magnitude of a specific range measurement
is larger than a specific number. MHSS assumes maximum
biases and Gaussian error distribution overbounds for the
range measurements, and the task of the ground monitoring
subsystem is to obtain the model parameters from data. These
parameters are the Gaussian overbound σURA (User Ranging
Accuracy) and a maximum nominal bias Bnom.
The Gaussian overbound σURA needs to be valid for very
small tail probabilities in the order of 10−7 or less. Conse-
quently, a large number of uncorrelated samples is necessary to
obtain the required confidence. The bias is not connected with
an explicit excess probability. Consequently, under nominal
conditions, |SISE − Bnom| is overbounded by a Gaussian
distribution with standard deviation σURA.
2) Verification of satellite & constellation fault rates: The
second objective of the ground network is to verify the fault
rates of satellites and constellations. These fault rates denote
the likelihood that the nominal SISE model as described above
is not valid. The probability is defined for the duration of an
approach, 150s, and refers to a single satellite. The ARAIM
concept is based on a certain level of commitment from the
CSP, in particular in the satellite failure probability charac-
terization. The value Psat and Pconst could be provided by
the CSP in the format of Service Performance Commitment.
The ARAIM ground monitoring has then only the role to
assess their correctness and robustness. This operation can
be performed only on long batch of data and updated on a
monthly basis.
An explicit and additional risk of constellation fault is
defined by Pconst. This probability refers to the case that
a large set of satellites, or the complete constellation, are
simultaneously affected by a common fault. Examples for
these faults are mismodeling of ephemeris parameters such as
the earth orientation w.r.t. the inertial frame (Earth Orientation
Parameter), or failures cause by improper operation of the
ground segment.
3) Connection of nominal SISE parameters and fault rates:
The connection between these two sets of parameters is, for a
single satellite
The probability that the distribution of SISE is not bounded
by a Gaussian distribution with mean value Bnom and standard
deviation σURA is contained in the satellite failure probability
Psat.
B. Short latency ISM
The short latency ISM on the other side can additionally
protect the ARAIM user in case an anomalous condition
occurs. In particular it aims to monitor and detect errors which
don’t change with respect to the short term update rate. It is
then designed to protect against slow dynamic errors. The only
content of the short-term ISM is for each satellite an upper
bound of the SISE on the short term ISM validity interval,
Bub.
The underlying concept of this approach is the division
of the single satellite fault threat space into two parts: One
that evolves slow enough so that users may be alerted before
the error effect becomes hazardous, and an another partition
covering faults with a higher dynamic, effectively only to be
mitigated by genuinely receiver autonomous methods. This
division is obtained by modeling possible faults according to
their physical origin and assigning probabilities individually.
This separation process is closely connected to the maximum
possible latency of the short-term channel.
All faults that can not be observed by the ground monitoring
have to be considered at the user level. These faults are handled
at receiver algorithm level, in particular an FDE detection
scheme is applied as a barrier to those threats.
The update rate can be in order of order of one hour, or
possibly longer if the separation of slow-dynamic and fast-
dynamic threats allows for detecting a significant part of the
errors in more long-term scenarios.
1) Relation of slow-dynamic error detection and satellite
fault rate: The satellite fault rate, Psat, is an estimate of
the likelihood that the nominal SISE error model is not valid
for a specific satellite. In conventional MHSS algorithms this
probability is used to determine the likelihood of a fault
hypothesis, i.e. a unique combination of assumed faults within
the set of available range measurements. Every likely fault
hypothesis is considered as one possible solution, and thus a
position estimate is computed excluding the potentially faulted
satellites. The impact of these potential faults on the position
estimate is attributed by including all partial solutions into a
protection level interval.
With the proposed extension of the user algorithm the user
can already determine the worst-case impact of a non-nominal
SISE on the position solution, if it can be observed by the
short-term ground monitoring. The corresponding probability
of those specific faults consequently need not be considered
in the MHSS hypothesis. The Psat determined by long-term
monitoring thus has to cover only fast-dynamic non-nominal
SISE threats.
Previously, a flexible operation mode of the user algorithm
was proposed where either only long-term monitoring or with
both ISM types available. To provide robust modeling of the
threat space, the long-term monitoring thus would theoretically
need to estimate two sets of Psat parameters for every satellite:
A likelihood that any non-nominal fault occurs for users that
use only the long-term monitoring, and a likelihood that fast
dynamic errors occur for those users that use the slow-dynamic
threat observation function of the short-latency component.
In fact in case of only long term ISM the satellite failure
probability is as follows
Psat =
NT∑
i=1
PTi (5)
where NT indicates the whole number of threats and PTi the
state probability of the i-th threat. If also the short term ISM
is used, then the satellite failure probability becomes
Psat =
NHDT∑
j=1
PTj +
NSDT∑
k=1
PTkP
ARAIM
MD,k (6)
where NHDT and NSDT respectively are the number of high-
dynamic and slow dynamic threats.
With a short term monitoring, the slow dynamic threats
would be included with a reduced state probability (original
one multiplied by the ARAIM ground monitoring missed
detection probability, PARAIMMD ). It is observed that this dis-
tinction of the satellite failure probability a negligible impact at
user level for the protection level equations. In fact this value
is used to estimate the failure mode probability, which weight
the corresponding subset protection level. A small variation
of the Psat has a negligible impact and would require the
transmission to the user of the PARAIMMD ) values. For this
reason the use algorithm proposed considers conservatively
the long latency satellite failure probability 5.
The impact has instead to be considered at FDE algorithm
level, where a reduced risk can be allocated to this monitoring
with an increased missed detection probability.
2) Estimation of the upper bound of instantaneous SISE:
The upper bound Bub refers to the worst case SISE that
might be effective for any user within the service volume,
at any time instant during the validity period of the short-term
ISM. It is comprehensible that only faults with known time-
characteristics can be monitored that way. These fault types
can include:
• Clock runoffs with an observable clock drift rate
• Ephemeris errors that result in ephemeris errors slowly
building up
All these faults might be classified as either unobservable
or observable, depending on their rate - only if the SISE ramp
builds up slow enough it can be guaranteed that users can be
successfully alerted.
Furthermore the upper bound, Bub, takes into account also
the ARAIM ground monitoring estimation accuracy as shown
in figure 2. This is necessary to avoid having to transmit also
this information to the user, which would be otherwise needed
in the protection level equation.
Fig. 2. ARAIM ground monitoring process to estimate the error upper bound.
3) Motivation for dual monitoring approach: The introduc-
tion of the short term ISM introduces of course an additional
element and then a further degree of complexity, but is
motivated by the following advantages:
• New constellations will have an initial long phase where
ISM operators may desire to limit the confidence assigned
to the GNSS operators’ performance figures. In this phase
it is necessary to support the user as much as possible
in detecting any failure condition. Since the ARAIM
architecture should be as independent as possible from a
ground monitoring, the best trade off for the ISM latency
between its detection capability and its requirements on
the architecture should be used.
• A short term ISM is a further degree of freedom for
each ASNP. Independently short term monitors could
be provided depending on the authority region and the
provider. The user algorithm remains compatible with
worldwide environments, using different integrity risk
allocation depending on the scenario. This would be
reflected in different threshold values for the FDE, which
can be hardcoded as a lookup table in the receiver. This
solution also enables simplicity of the receiver design,
implementing only one algorithm.
• Having a monitor with a shorter update rate allows the
relaxation of the user requirements. In fact the user
FDE algorithm will be tuned according to a predefined
probability of missed detection. This probability depends
on the overall integrity risk allocation and in particular
takes into account that the product of the prior fault
probability and the missed detection probability must be
smaller that the allocated part of the integrity risk. Now
introducing an additional monitoring at ARAIM ground
segment level part of the threats will be detected and
monitored on ground, as shown in 4. The effect is a
reduced threat occurrence probability. The final result is
an improvements in terms of availability.
Fig. 3. Threat allocation among GNSS, ARAIM ground monitoring and user
The architecture characteristics and properties are summa-
rized in Table I.
TABLE I
ARAIM ARCHITECTURE CHARACTERISTICS
ISM
type
Content Latency Monitoring
Network
Dissemination
Long
term
bias and standard
deviation of
long term
constellation
nominal errors
1
month
global
(ISM,
GNSS,
SBAS)
global
(GNSS,
SBAS)
Short
term
upper bound of
the short term
constellation
failures
1 hour global
(ISM,
GNSS,
SBAS) or
local
global
(GNSS) or
local (VDB)
III. USER ALGORITHM
The algorithm proposed and described in this paper has
many similarities with [1], but presents the following important
differences:
• The solution separation approach MHSS is used only for
the Fault Detection and Exclusion (together with the χ2
test [1]) but not for the estimation of the protection level,
where instead the short term ISM information is used
to model the errors. With this approach the advantage
is that in the failure condition cases, where the MHSS
approach excludes the failing satellites to estimate the
subset solution, this algorithm uses all the satellites: for
the failing satellite it uses a degraded model (with a
mean value Bub from the short term ISM instead of
Bnom from the long term ISM). The advantage is that the
overall protection levels are reduced and the availability
improves, as shown in the next section,
• The integrity of the user is estimated not computing the
protection level to be compared with the Alert Limit,
but computing the integrity risk, that is directly the tail
area delimited by the Alert Limit. The advantage is that
there is no need in this approach to allocate statically
the integrity risk between the vertical and horizontal
components.
The user ARAIM algorithm is constituted by the following
steps:
• Covariance matrix estimation
• Position estimation
• Computation of the maximum number of simultaneous
faults affecting the integrity risk
• Fault detection and exclusion
• Computation of the fault-free and faulty biases and co-
variance matrixes
• Integrity risk estimation and comparison with the require-
ment threshold
These steps are detailed in the following3:
A. Covariance matrix estimation
The covariance matrix C is defined as follows ([1])
C(i, i) = σ2URA,i + σ
2
tropo,i + σ
2
user,i (7)
where σURA,i is the standard deviation of the satellite orbit and
clock errors and is contained in the Integrity Support Message.
σtropo,i is the standard deviation of the tropospheric delay
modelled which is expressed according to [6] as
σtropo(θ) = 0.12
(
1.001√
0.002001 + (sin( piθ180 ))
2
)
(8)
with θ the elevation angle expressed in degrees. The standard
deviation of the receiver noise, σGPSuser , is modelled according
to [7]
σGPSuser =
√
f4L1 + f
4
L5
(f2L1 − f
2
L5)
2
√
σ2MP + σ
2
Noise (9)
σMP (θ) = 0.13 + 0.53e
−
θ
10 (10)
σNoise(θ) = 0.15 + 0.43e
−
θ
6.9 (11)
3In the following steps the Bnom and σURA indicates scalar values in the
range domain. But if actually they are designed in the satellite domain (long-
track, cross-track, radial and clock component), as previously suggested, a
projection on the specific user range domain must be performed as preliminary
step.
B. Position estimation
The position solution is obtained by means of a least square
linear estimation as described in [8]. In particular, for the linear
observation equation
ρ = Hx+ ε (12)
where x is the vector containing the user position offset in
ECEF and user clock offset, the ρ contains the pseudorange
measurements, the solution is
x = Sρ (13)
S = (HTC−1H)−1HTC−1 (14)
The position covariance matrix is
Σ = (HTC−1H)−1 (15)
and the same matrix in a local reference system (east,
north and up) is obtained with a rotation matrix R =
{eeast, enorth, eup}, that is
Senu = R
T {(HTC−1H)−1HTC−1}submatrix(3,N) (16)
Σenu = (SenuCS
T
enu) (17)
Σenu =

 σe σen σeuσen σn σnu
σeu σnu σu

 (18)
C. Computation of the maximum number of simultaneous
faults affecting integrity risk
This algorithm computes the probability that a certain
number of satellites have simultaneously a failure and check
whether this is negligible with respect to the overall integrity
risk requirement. This algorithm computes also the probability
of having a certain number of simultaneous failures, i.e the
probability of each combination with narrow fault PNF , as
well as the probability of a faulty free system PFF . The
reference algorithm is described in detail in [1].
D. Fault detection and exclusion
This algorithm detect anomalous range error using two
tests: a solution separation test and chi square test. A suitable
algorithm for this part is also described in detail in [1].
E. Computation of the fault-free and faulty biases and
covariance matrixes
After the positioning and the fault detection and exclusion
the receiver has to estimate the integrity parameters. For this
purpose it uses a model based on the information provided by
the ISM.
In fact there are several possibilities depending on the
number and the combination of simultaneous satellite failures.
Each failure combination is considered separately and the
relative integrity risk estimated. The final integrity risk is then
the sum of all the contribution.
The model for the fault free satellites is assumed to follow
a Gaussian distribution in the range domain with nominal bias
as provided by the long term ISM
ǫrange,FaultFree,i ∼ (19)
N(Bnom,i,
√
σ2URA,i + σ
2
tropo,i + σ
2
user,i) (20)
The error model in the position domain after projection in the
east, north and up reference system, is
ǫenu,FaultFree ∼ N(µenu,FF ,Σenu,FF ) (21)
where
µeast,FF (i) = |Stopo[1, i]|Bnom(i) (22)
µnorth,FF (i) = |Stopo[2, i]|Bnom(i) (23)
µup,FF (i) = |Stopo[3, i]|Bnom(i) (24)
The model for the faulty satellites is also assumed to follow
a Gaussian distribution in the range domain with the upper
bound as contained in the short term ISM
ǫrange,Faulty,i ∼ N(Bub,i,
√
σ2tropo,i + σ
2
user,i) (25)
Since the upper bound contains already the ARAIM ground
monitoring estimation accuracy and also an estimation of the
maximum satellite orbit and clock errors, the range error
standard deviation is constituted only by the tropospheric and
the receiver noise.
All failure combinations are considered up to the maximum
number of simultaneous failure as previously estimated. For
this narrow failure case all the signals are characterized as
fault free except for the failing satellites for which the fault
mode is considered.
In the position domain after projection in the east, north and
up reference system, the position error model is
ǫenu,Faulty,j ∼ N(µenu,NF ,Σenu,NF ) (26)
where
µeast,NF (i) = |Stopo[1, i]|Bub(i) (27)
µnorth,NF (i) = |Stopo[2, i]|Bub(i) (28)
µup,NF (i) = |Stopo[3, i]|Bub(i) (29)
µhor,NF (i) =
√
µ2east,NF (i) + µ
2
north,NF (i) (30)
The standard deviation in the horizontal position plane is
the following
αhor =
√√√√σ2e + σ2n
2
+
√(
σ2e − σ
2
n
2
)2
+ σ2en (31)
Fig. 4. SISE model based on long and short latency ISM
F. Integrity risk estimation and comparison with the
requirement threshold
The assurance of the vertical error bound, that is the
integrity risk probability, is finally constituted by the following
contributions
PHMI,vert(V AL) =PHMI,vert,FF (V AL)+ (32)
NFailureMode∑
i=1
PHMI,vert,NF,i (33)
PHMI,vert(V AL) =
{
Q
(
V AL− µFF
σu,FF
)
+
Q
(
V AL+ µFF
σu,FF
)}
PFF+
Nsubset∑
i=1
{
Q
(
V AL− µNF
σu,NF
)
+
Q
(
V AL+ µNF
σu,NF
)}
PNF (i) (34)
The horizontal error bound is guaranteed by
PHMI,horz(HAL) =
{
Q
(
HAL− µFF
αu,FF
)
+
Q
(
HAL+ µFF
αu,FF
)}
PFF+
Nsubset∑
i=1
{
Q
(
HAL− µNF
αu,NF
)
+
Q
(
HAL+ µNF
αu,NF
)}
PNF (i) (35)
with the cumulative distribution function of a non-central χ2-
distribution with degree of freedom 2 (argument x and non-
centrality parameter λ):
cdfχ2(x, λ) =
x∫
0
pdfχ2(t, λ)dt (36)
pdfχ2(x, λ) =
1
2
e−
1
2
(x+λ)
∞∑
i=0
xiλi
22i(i!)2
(37)
The overall integrity risk is finally compared with the re-
quirement threshold in order to assess the service availability:
the service is in fact not available in case the integrity risk is
not ensured to be smaller than the requirement threshold of
PHMI,vert + PHMI,hor ≤ 10
−7
.
IV. ALGORITHM VALIDATION WITH A MULTICONSTEL-
LATION MULTIFREQUENCY SCENARIO
The algorithm has been validated with real data collected
with a multiconstellation multifrequency receiver. In particular
the receiver could track GPS, GLONASS and also three
Galileo satellites4. All the measurements were collected and
processed on two frequencies (L1 and L5).
In order to validate with real data an integrity algorithm, it
would be necessary to insert satellite orbit and clock feared
events in the received signals. Since there is no possibility to
artificially manipulate the navigation signals, a work around
was found for this research. A GNSS repeater was used to
deteriorate the signals. In fact the DLR has a flight experimen-
tation center with aircraft used for research purpose. Inside the
hangar hosting the DLR aircraft there is a GNSS repeater used
for indoor positioning and instrument testing.
GNSS repeaters largely disturb GNSS receivers which are
in the proximity of the hangar and represent a source of
interference to be detected and eliminated. Authorities have
recently been investigating in detail the topic, particularly after
a series of service interruptions caused by a GNSS repeater
have been observed at the Hannover airport in Germany [9].
The measurement campaign was performed in two phases
of one hour each. During the first one the GNSS repeater
was switched off and the receiver was outside the hangar
with the door opened in a static configuration. During this
phase the receiver was calibrated observing its performance
in nominal condition. In the second phase the GNSS repeater
was switched on and the receiver started moving. The receiver
was moved approaching the hangar and then in the opposite
direction. This procedure had the scope to create situations
where a subsets of measurements were tracking the satellites
through the direct path and part of them through the repeater.
The goal was in fact to create an inconsistency among the
measurements, which can be detected by the ARAIM FDE
algorithm. A further goal was to estimate the protection level
and in particular to compare the performance of the ARAIM
algorithm based on a long term ISM described in [1] with the
one proposed in this paper based on the use of a short term
ISM.
A. Scenario description
Figure 5 shows the field where the measurement campaign
was performed. The hangar has a GNSS repeater inside, whose
sending antenna is located on the roof inside the hangar as
4During the measurement campaign all 4 Galileo IOV satellites were
actually visible but one of them was not transmitting any signal
Fig. 5. Measurement campaign at the DLR airport hangar where a GNSS
repeater was disturbing the multiconstellation receiver
shown in Figure 5. The GNSS repeater retransmits the signals
with a 55dB amplification. The receiver was a JAVAD Sigma
GNSS receiver based on a TRIUMPH Chip, configured to
track GPS, GLONASS and Galileo dual frequency L1 and L5
signals.
The measurements were processed with dual frequency
iono-free linear combination, troposphere model and position-
ing according to the MOPS processing chain [8]. The reference
data were generated with a commercial software performing
a PPP with precise IGS orbit, clocks and ionex data.
Figure 6 shows the sky plot in the first phase when the
repeater was switched off and the hangar door was closed.
The hangar was blocking the reception of all the signals
coming from north-west. Whereas with the repeater switched
on and the hangar door opened also satellites behind the hangar
become visible (Figure 7).
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Fig. 6. Sky plot with the repeater switched off and the hangar door closed.
According to the Universal Satellite Indexes standard, PRN <= 37 for GPS,
38 <= PRN <= 70 for GLONASS and PRN >= 71 for Galileo
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Fig. 7. Sky plot with the repeater switched on and the hangar door opened.
According to the Universal Satellite Indexes standard, PRN <= 37 for GPS,
38 <= PRN <= 70 for GLONASS and PRN >= 71 for Galileo
B. ARAIM configuration and settings
The Advanced RAIM was configured with the following
ISM values:
• Bnom = 0.5m
• σURA = 0.75[m] for GPS and Galileo and σURA = 1[m]
for GLONASS
• σURE = 0.5 · σURA
• Bub = maxSISE+Kmdσground = 10+5.19×0.99[m]
• Psat = Pconst = 10
−4
C. Failure detection
The effect of the GNSS repeater on the receiver can be
appreciated in Figure 8.
When the repeater is switched on the receiver starts tracking
the signals coming from the repeater instead those from
the direct path. When all the signals are tracked from the
repeater, as it happens in the indoor positioning case, the
PVT algorithm provides the position of the repeater receiving
antenna. Beside the estimated clock offset contains the delay
due to the distance between the receiver and the repeater (and
the eventual re-transmission delay). Usually not all tracking
loops change from tracking the SV signal to tracking the
repeated signal at the same time. In particular in our scenario
satellites with high elevation and their line of sight close to the
hangar (e.g PRN 5) happened to start being tracked through
the repeater before other signals. The effect in the specific
case is displayed in Figure 8: satellite (PRN 5) presented a
significantly larger range error with respect to the others (in
the order of 100m). After few seconds the receiver started
tracking all the signals from the repeater. The effect can be
appreciated in the common jump in all the range errors.
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Fig. 8. Range error, computed as the difference between the measured range,
corrected for the propagation error and the clock offsets, and the true range
Figure 9 shows the effect on the PVT solution in particular
for the user clock offset estimation. The clock offset absorbs
the biases due to the distance between the receiver and the
repeater, as shown in Figure 9.
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Fig. 9. User clock offset estimation error
It is highlighted that the clock offset estimation is degraded
in the interval of time in which the the PRN 5 has a large
range error.
Also the residuals shows the anomaly, as displayed in Figure
10.
The ARAIM algorithm in particular the FDE part is able to
detect the anomalous condition of PRN 5 and set an invalid
satellite flag, as shown in Figure 11 (value 1 indicates excluded
satellites).
The FDE algorithm can detect correctly the failure condition
and improve the positioning performance. In particular the
clock offset error is not anymore affected by the PRN 5
0 50 100 150
−60
−40
−20
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
Processing epoch [s]
R
es
id
ua
ls[
m]
 
 
SV=2
SV=5
SV=10
SV=12
SV=21
SV=25
SV=29
SV=31
SV=42
SV=44
SV=45
SV=46
SV=48
SV=49
SV=81
SV=82
Fig. 10. PVT residuals, defined as the difference between measured
pseudorange, processed for propagation errors and satellite clock errors and
the estimated range
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Fig. 11. Satellite flag output of the FDE algorithm: 1 for satellite excluded
and 0 for fault free satellites
anomaly, as it can be appreciated comparing Figure 9 with
Figure 12.
The position error is significantly improved as it is shown
by comparing Figure 13 with Figure 14 and Figure 15 with
Figure 16.
The results demonstrated and confirmed the capability of
the ARAIM FDE algorithm to protect the users against errors
in the ranging signals.
D. Protection Level comparison
The second part of the measurement campaign aimed to
assess and compare the performance of the ARAIM integrity
estimation of the following two alternatives:
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Fig. 12. User clock offset estimation error after satellite exclusion performed
by the FDE algorithm
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Fig. 13. Difference between the PVT estimated position and the true
reference position.
• the ARAIM algorithm, presented in [1], based on a long
term ISM and on a MHSS approach
• the ARAIM algorithm, presented in this paper, based on
the combination of a long term with a short term ISM.
The short term part is used to model the faulty satellites
without using a subset reduced geometry as foreseen by
the MHSS approach.
The protection levels time series and histograms are dis-
played respectively in Figure 17 and Figure 185.
The improvement in terms of reduced protection level was
confirmed by the real data results. The reduction of the
protection level is ensured by the fact that for each failing
5As described in the previous section the algorithm presented in this
paper estimates the integrity risk instead of the protection level. In order to
compare the performances of the two alternatives, for the second alternative
the equivalent value of the protection level was derived from the integrity risk
estimation (with a Q-inverse function)
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Fig. 14. Difference between the ARAIM estimated position and the true
reference position.
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Fig. 15. Histogram of the difference between the PVT estimated position
and the true reference position.
condition the whole geometry is used, instead of a reduced one
of a constellation subsets. The fault in the satellite is modelled
considering an increased bias (Bub), which anyway does not
have a large effect on the protection level in comparison to the
geometry degradation of the MHSS approach. In fact although
the short term ISM used as input value was significantly
large (in the order of 10m), the algorithm proposed provided
smaller protection levels. This measurement campaign showed
that including the short term monitoring allows modelling
properly the errors to ensure the necessary integrity service and
at the same time allows avoiding the degradation of service
availability caused by the conservatism of the MHSS approach.
V. CONCLUSION
The Advanced RAIM architecture aims to provide aviation
users with vertical guidance up to precision approach with
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Fig. 16. Histogram of the difference between the ARAIM estimated position
and the true reference position.
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Fig. 17. Protection level time series: performance comparison between the
ARAIM algorithm presented in this paper and the one described in [1].
the minimal dependency from the ground monitoring. This
challenging task has to face the difficulties related to new con-
stellations: reticence to meet a service commitment from the
Constellation Service Provider due to the lack of history data
and the confidence on the system. On the other side it has also
to provide worldwide compatibility while a regional or local
sovereignty from each ASNPs. All these difficulties, if not
correctly handled, risk to delay significantly the introduction
of this technology.
This paper proposes an alternative ARAIM Architecture
which is based on the combination of a long term and a short
term augmentation information (ISM). Besides it presents the
user algorithm suitable for this architecture. The advantages
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Fig. 18. Protection level histograms: performance comparison between the
ARAIM algorithm presented in this paper and the one described in [1].
of this design with respect to others are interesting. It allows
each ASNP to reuse existing trusted and certified infrastructure
(local monitoring or dissemination network). Each ASNP can
use a different update rate for the short term ISM allowing an
important system flexibility. It relaxes the user requirements in
detecting failure conditions improving the position availability
(of primary importance for new constellation where many
unexpected unknown threats will arise in the first years of
operation). It provides a simplified user algorithm, which
remains worldwide compatible even if the short term ISM
present several update rate.
The proposed user algorithm was validated with a three
constellation scenario (GPS, GLONASS, Galileo) and using a
GNSS repeater of the DLR flight experiment center to generate
system anomalies. The presented algorithm demonstrated its
robustness in detecting the failure conditions and improving
the position accuracy. Furthermore the proposed algorithm
provided a significant improvement in terms of protection
level, improving service availability with respect to existing
user algorithms.
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